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SETTLEMENT PENDING APPEAL: AN ARGUMENT
FOR VACATUR
INTRODUCTION
Parties to a federal civil suit may consent to dismiss the case pursuant
to a settlement agreement.' Because settlement is an option available un-
til final judgment is entered, it may occur while an appeal is pending.
When it does, the parties to the case often decide to condition settlement
on vacatur of the lower court judgment.2 Vacatur has the effect of "void-
ing" a judgment.3 Parties to a settlement agreement seek vacatur for
several reasons. For example, vacatur may allow parties to avoid the
preclusive effect4 of the judgment in a future action5 or it may enable
1. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that "an action may be dismissed
by the plaintiff without order of court ... by filing a stipulation of dismissal signed by all
parties who have appeared in the action." Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1).
Settlement "offer[s] the court the not unattractive prospect of foregoing further pro-
ceedings in the case." Nestle Co. v. Chester's Mkt., 596 F. Supp. 1445, 1455 (D. Conn.
1984), rev'd, 756 F.2d 280 (2d Cir. 1985). Even while denying a motion to vacate, the
Seventh Circuit acknowledged that "[it is hard to be against settlement." In re Memo-
rial Hosp., 862 F.2d 1299, 1302 (7th Cir. 1988).
The Federal Rules themselves encourage settlement. See, e.g., Delta Air Lines v. Au-
gust, 450 U.S. 346, 352 (1981) ("The purpose of [Fed. R. Civ. P.] 68 is to encourage the
settlement of litigation."). For example, Rule 68 penalizes a party who rejects a settle-
ment offer, if the judgment received is not more favorable than the offer. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 68.
District judges can encourage and participate in settlement negotiations through con-
ferences. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 16. The circuit court may also require a prehearing confer-
ence. See Fed. R. App. P. 33. Rule 33 provides in pertinent part that "[t]he court may
direct the attorneys for the parties to appear before the court or a judge thereof for a
prehearing conference to consider the simplification of the issues and such other matters
as may aid in the disposition of the proceeding by the court." Id. The Second Circuit
Court of Appeals employs staff counsel who conduct pre-argument settlement confer-
ences. See Kaufman, The Pre-Argument Conference: An Appellate Procedural Reform,
74 Colum. L. Rev. 1094, 1096-98 (1974).
2. See Memorial Hosp., 862 F.2d at 1300; Nestle, 596 F. Supp. at 1446.
In Nestle, the parties submitted affidavits affirming the necessity of vacatur to the set-
tlement agreement. Plaintiff, the loser in the district court, called vacatur "an essential
condition of the settlement." Nestle, 596 F. Supp. at 1446 (quoting Affidavit of Allen F.
Maulsby, Attorney for Plaintiff at 3). Defendant agreed, stating that "the controversy
in its present posture can be resolved, and plaintiff will forego its appeal, only if plaintiff,
as a condition of the settlement, can obtain [vacatur]." Id. (quoting Affidavit of Barry
Garfinkel, Attorney for Defendant at 7).
3. Vacatur is "a rule or order by which a proceeding is vacated." Black's Law Dic-
tionary 1388 (5th ed. 1979). To vacate is "[t]o render an act void; as, to vacate an entry
of record, or a judgment." Id. The practical and legal effects of vacatur on a judgment
are discussed infra notes 80-111 and accompanying text.
4. The first Justice Harlan wrote that issue preclusion meant that "a right, question
or fact distinctly put in issue and directly determined by a court of competent jurisdic-
tion, as a ground of recovery, cannot be disputed in a subsequent suit between the same
parties or their privies.... ." Southern Pac. R.R. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1, 48 (1897).
This principle, also known as collateral estoppel, has more widespread application to-
day than it did at the time of Southern Pacific, because of the demise of the "mutuality
doctrine." The mutuality doctrine limited the application of issue preclusion to the par-
ties and "their privies." Id. Today, third parties can apply issue preclusion against the
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58
them to avoid the non-legal ramifications of an adverse judgment.'
The decision to grant or to deny vacatur implicates private and public
interests that sometimes conflict.7 In the interest of settling litigation,
some federal circuits routinely grant motions to dismiss and vacate.'
Others, however, cite the value of the lower court judgment and refuse to
grant vacatur.9
This Note will discuss whether a federal appellate court should vacate
the judgment of a lower court when the parties' settlement pending ap-
peal is conditioned upon vacatur. Part I of this Note examines the rela-
tionship between settlement and vacatur, as well as how mootness relates
to vacatur. Part I also explores the public and private interests impli-
cated by vacatur and the standard of review applied to a motion to va-
cate. Part II analyzes the conflicting public and private interests in the
contexts of vacatur's effect on settlement, precedent and issue preclusion.
loser in the original action. See F. James & G. Hazard, Civil Procedure § 11.24 (3d ed.
1985).
Issue preclusion is one component of res judicata. The other component is claim pre-
clusion. Id. at § 11.3.
5. See Nestle Co. v. Chester's Mkt., 756 F.2d 280, 281 (2d Cir. 1985) ("[Plaintiff]
understandably feared that the existence of the [lower court] judgment would operate as
collateral estoppel in future litigation.").
6. See infra note 64 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 37-48 and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., Federal Data Corp. v. SMS Data Prods. Group, 819 F.2d 277 (Fed. Cir.
1987); Kennedy v. Block, 784 F.2d 1220 (4th Cir. 1986); Nestle, 756 F.2d 280; see also
Blackwelder v. Safnauer, 866 F.2d 548, 551 (2nd Cir. 1989) (dictum) (favoring vacatur
"in some circumstances" and citing Nestle); First Nat'l Bank v. Don Adams Mining Co.,
844 F.2d 1445, 1446 (10th Cir. 1988) (panel vacates own prior judgment pursuant to
settlement).
The Second Circuit has apparently overturned its own rule against vacatur, sub silen-
tio. Compare Nestle, 756 F.2d at 283 (favoring "honoring settlements over the finality of
trial court judgments"), with Sampson v. RCA, 434 F.2d 315, 317 (2d Cir. 1970) ("A
motion under [Fed. R. Civ. P.] 60(b) [to vacate] cannot be used to avoid the consequences
of a party's decision to settle the litigation or to forego an appeal from an adverse
ruling.").
9. See, e.g., In re Memorial Hosp., 862 F.2d 1299 (7th Cir. 1988); Fishman v. Estate
of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 585 (7th Cir. 1986); Ringsby Truck Lines v. Western Conf. of
Teamsters, 686 F.2d 720, 721 (9th Cir. 1982) (dictum). But see Hartley v. Mentor Corp.,
869 F.2d 1469 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Gould v. Control Laser Corp., 866 F.2d 1391 (Fed. Cir.
1989). While both cases appear to overrule prior Federal Circuit precedents allowing
vacatur, neither actually do.
The court in Hartley states:
[T]o be assured that the judgment here would have no collateral estoppel effect,
[plaintiff] would have had to have the [lower] court vacate its order, which he
failed to do; otherwise the collateral estoppel effect of the judgment is left for
decision by the district court in which it is asserted.
869 F.2d at 1473. This statement of the rule allowing vacatur does not reject vacatur;
rather it holds that the rule is inapplicable to Hartley because the parties therein did not
seek vacatur.
Gould is distinguished because the consent agreement ending the suit had been entered
prior to the appeal to the circuit court. See Gould, 866 F.2d at 1395. The case was
already over when the motion to vacate was made. It did not become moot on appeal, it
became moot before appeal. Thus, there was no case to settle. See id.
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This Note concludes that appellate courts should presumptively grant
vacatur to promote settlement, in light of the speculative and de minimis
nature of its attendant costs.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Settlement and Vacatur
Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure command a "just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action,"1 there is doubt
that the goals of speed and economy are being accomplished. 1 One rea-
son is docket congestion. In 1943, fewer than 80,000 cases were fied in
federal court. 2 By 1987, the number had increased to approximately
240,000,13 a jump of 200 percent.1 4 Commentators have identified sev-
eral causes for increased litigation, including the tendency of Americans
to resolve disputes through litigation and the recognition of new substan-
tive rights. 5 The legal community has responded to docket congestion
in at least two ways. Alternative dispute resolution ("ADR") devices,
which attempt to facilitate an end to litigation, have been developed to
keep out of court disputes that otherwise could be resolved only through
litigation.6 The parties are also encouraged to settle,'" because settle-
10. Fed. R. Civ. P. 1.
11. See Miller, The Adversary System: Dinosaur or Phoenix, 69 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 1
(1984) ("The inability of the American judicial system to adjudicate civil disputes eco-
nomically and efficiently is one of the most pressing issues facing the courts today.").
12. See W. McLauchlan, Federal Court Caseloads 113 (1984) (statistical analysis of
federal caseloads).
13. See Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States 169,
table C (1987).
14. During approximately the same period, the number of federal judges also rose 200
percent. See McLauchlan, supra note 12, at 74-75 (increase in circuit court judges) &
114-15 (increase in district court judges). However, based on thorough statistical analysis
of the federal caseload, "it does not appear that additional judges have 'solved' the
problems of increased filings." Id. at 201-02.
15. See Lambros, The Future ofAlternative Dispute Resolution, 14 Pepperdine L. Rev.
801, 802 (1987) (increased litigation due to changes in social interaction and attitudes);
Miller, supra note 11, at 3 (increased litigation due to "massive growth in the number of
substantive rights recognized by American law, some unfortunate side effects of ... our
extremely permissive and forgiving procedural system, and the unique economics of the
American legal system."). Professor Miller cites newly-created substantive rights in the
areas of civil rights, political rights, environmental law, consumer law and physical safety
law. See id. at 5. For examples, see Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375
(1983) (recognizing implied right of action for violation of § 10(b) of the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979) (recognizing private right
of action for violation of fifth amendment due process provision); Cannon v. University of
Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979) (recognizing implied right of action for violation of
§ 901(a) of Title IX prohibition against gender discrimination at educational institutions
receiving government assistance, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1972)); Bivens v. Six Unknown
Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (recognizing private right
of action for violation of fourth amendment prohibition against unreasonable search or
seizure); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (recognizing implied right of action
for violation of § 14(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934).
16. ADR devices include mediation, arbitration, summary jury trials, and mini-trials.
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ment is a natural solution when parties to a dispute seek an alternative to
final judgment.18
The Federal Rules 9 and the judiciary2" strongly encourage settlement
because it reduces docket congestion. Settlement is also usually the best
reflection of the parties' true interests.21 When a settlement is reached,.
the parties decide, rather than a judge or jury, what is a fair and reason-
able end to their dispute. Given these benefits of settlement, courts
should have a compelling reason if they are to reject a reasonable settle-
ment reached by litigants. Refusing to allow vacatur may discourage set-
tlement by appellants who consider vacatur an important part of
settlement.22 Refusal to vacate may force parties to continue an appeal,
at cost to themselves, their adversaries, the overburdened appellate
courts and, by extension, the public.23
B. Relationship Between Mootness and Vacatur
Mootness is often an issue in motions to vacate: parties argue that a
settlement, by eliminating the most evident form of controversy, renders
the case moot.24 Mootness obligates an appellate court to dismiss the
See Lambros, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Alternative Methods of Dispute Resolu-
tion: A Report to the Judicial Conference of the United States, Committee on the Opera-
tion of the Jury System, 103 F.R.D. 461, 465-67 (1984). The adoption of a panoply of
ADR devices suggests that alternatives to litigation are essential to the operation of the
judicial system for litigants who need the formal civil or criminal process. See Brunet,
Questioning the Quality of Alternate Dispute Resolution, 62 Tul. L. Rev. 1, 2-3 (1987)
(citing commentators who recommend ADR as substitute for litigation in variety of com-
monly litigated areas).
17. Settlement is defined as "an agreement by which parties having disputed matters
between them reach or ascertain what is coming from one to the other." Black's Law
Dictionary 1231 (5th ed. 1979).
18. See Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. United States, 806 F.2d 1046, 1050 (Fed. Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 913 (1987); Bergh v. Department of Transp., 794 F.2d 1575,
1577 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 950 (1986); Bass v. Phoenix Seadrill/78 Ltd., 749
F.2d 1154, 1164 (5th Cir. 1985); ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music Ltd., 722 F.2d
988, 997 (2d Cir. 1983); Pearson v. Ecological Science Corp., 522 F.2d 171, 176 (5th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 912 (1976); see also F. Lacey, The Judge's Role in the Settle-
ment of Civil Suits 25-26 (1977) (settlement fosters justice and efficiency).
19. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
20. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
21. Proponents call this "reconciliation" because both parties are satisfied. See
McThenia & Shaffer, For Reconciliation, 94 Yale- L.J. 1660, 1666 (1985). Reconciliation
is considered superior to "resolution" through the judicial process, because the result of
mere resolution might be that only one party or neither party is satisfied. See id. Profes-
sor Owen Fiss, a critic of settlement, responds that "adjudication [i.e., judgment] is more
likely to do justice." Fiss, Out of Eden, 94 Yale L.J. 1669, 1673 (1985).
22. See Nestle Co. v. Chester's Mkt., 596 F. Supp. 1445, 1446 (D. Conn. 1984), rev'd,
756 F.2d 280 (2d Cir. 1985). But see In re Memorial Hosp., 862 F.2d 1299, 1303 (7th
Cir. 1988).
23. See Memorial Hosp., 862 F.2d 1299 at 1302 (describing effects of denial of vaca-
tur); Nestle Co. v. Chester's Market, 756 F.2d 280, 282 (2d Cir. 1985) (same).
24. See, e.g., Memorial Hosp., 862 F.2d at 1301; Kennedy v. Block, 784 F.2d 1220,
1222-25 (4th Cir. 1986); Nestle, 756 F.2d at 281-82; Ringsby Truck Lines v. Western
Conf. of Teamsters, 686 F.2d 720, 721-22 (9th Cir. 1982).
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action and to vacate the lower court judgment.25
It is axiomatic that mootness deprives a federal court of subject matter
jurisdiction, because the matter no longer involves a "case" or "contro-
versy."26 For this reason, the Supreme Court held in United States v.
Munsingwear27 that when a case pending appeal becomes moot as a re-
sult of "happenstance"-an event beyond the parties' control-the ap-
pellate court must dismiss the appeal and vacate the lower court
judgment.28 Vacatur is granted in these circumstances because the losing
party in the court below has been denied an opportunity to litigate fully
his claim; mootness prevents the party from seeking review.29
Although Munsingwear is a tempting invitation for parties seeking va-
catur, courts supporting and opposing vacatur as an element of settle-
ment have noted that the Munsingwear rule is inapplicable to much
litigation ended by voluntary settlement.30 Munsingwear requires vaca-
tur when mootness is a result of uncontrollable outside circumstances.31
Settlement agreements, in contrast, are the result of voluntary, consen-
sual acts, not "happenstance. 32
Munsingwear also may not apply to cases in which the parties seek
25. See United States v. Munsingwear, 340 U.S. 36, 39-40 (1950).
26. See U.S. Const. art. III § 2; see also Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227,
239-41 (1937) (discussing constitutional dimension of mootness).
27. 340 U.S. 36 (1950).
28. See id. at 39-40.
29. See id. at 39.
30. See, e.g., In re Memorial Hosp., 862 F.2d 1299, 1301 (7th Cir. 1988); Nestle Co.
v. Chester's Mkt., 756 F.2d 280, 281-82 (2d Cir. 1985); Ringsby Truck Lines v. Western
Conf. of Teamsters, 686 F.2d 720, 721-22 (9th Cir. 1982).
31. See United States v. Munsingwear, 340 U.S. 36, 39-40 (1950).
32. The Court's analysis in Karcher v. May, 484 U.S. 72 (1987), suggests that it would
not automatically find an action moot because of settlement. See id. at 83. For an action
to be considered moot for Munsingwear purposes, the mootness must be the result of an
occurrence "unattributable" to the parties. As the Court explained, "[t]his controversy
did not become moot due to circumstances unattributable to any of the parties. The
controversy ended when the losing party.., declined to pursue its appeal. Accordingly,
the Munsingwear procedure is inapplicable to this case." Id. Because settlement is a
bargain between the parties to which neither is forced to agree, settlement cannot be said
to be "unattributable" to them. See United States v. Garde, 848 F.2d 1307, 1310-11
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (refusing appellant's request for vacatur under Karcher
analysis).
In its criticism of vacatur, the Garde opinion misstated the Second Circuit's holding in
Nestle by asserting that the Nestle court "decided against vacatur." Garde, 848 F.2d at
1310 n.6. But see Nestle, 756 F.2d at 284 (granting vacatur).
Several decisions prior to Karcher anticipated its analysis. See, e.g., Cover v. Schwartz,
133 F.2d 541, 546 (2d Cir. 1942) (unilateral action by appellant in absence of settlement
and final judgment cannot be basis for vacatur), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 745 (1943); Ring-
sby, 686 F.2d at 721 (citing Cover as precedent to deny settlement conditioned upon vaca-
tur). But see Nestle, 756 F.2d at 283 n.4 (asserting Ringsby "misread" Cover by extending
its analysis to settlements conditioned upon vacatur, rather than limiting it to one appel-
lant's unilateral motion to vacate); Greenbaum, Mootness on Appeal in Federal Courts: A
Reexamination of the Consequences of Appellate Disposition, 17 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 7, 36
n.134 (1983) (criticizing Ringsby for failing to recognize the distinction in the text of
Munsingwear).
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vacatur as a condition of settlement, because those cases are not necessar-
ily moot.a3 In fact, "[t]he presence of a live controversy is amply demon-
strated by [a party's] insistence on a vacatur prior to settlement so as to
preserve its right to pursue an appeal should the judgment remain in
effect."3 4 Should vacatur be denied, the losing party may continue to
litigate because the controversy remains, as it does following the break-
down of any settlement agreement. "The case is neither more nor less
moot than it would be if the loser were satisfied with the judgment and
complied without appealing."3" Therefore, because of Munsingwear's
self-imposed restriction on the granting of vacatur, whether vacatur
should be allowed pursuant to settlement must be considered outside that
case's narrow analytical framework.36
C. Conflict Between Public and Private Interests
Vacatur raises issues that have come to be characterized as conflicts
between private interests, such as early termination of litigation, and
public interests, such as preservation of the lower court judgment's inher-
ent value.37 Whether public and private goals are actually in conflict
33. See Memorial Hosp., 862 F.2d at 1301; Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520,
585 (7th Cir. 1986); Nestle, 756 F.2d at 282. But see Tosco Corp. v. Hodel, 826 F.2d 948,
948 (10th Cir. 1987) (case mooted by execution of settlement agreement); Kennedy v.
Block, 784 F.2d 1220, 1225 (4th Cir. 1986) (parties' settlement moots action).
34. Nestle Co. v. Chester's Market, 756 F.2d 280, 282 (2d Cir. 1985).
35. In re Memorial Hosp., 862 F.2d 1299, 1301 (7th Cir. 1988).
36. The issue presented when the parties' settlement is conditioned upon vacatur
should be distinguished from those raised when parties settle without seeking vacatur. In
the latter circumstance, if settlement makes the case moot, then vacatur is required under
Munsingwear, even when the parties expressly object to it. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Block,
784 F.2d 1220, 1222-25 (4th Cir. 1986).
Kennedy involved settlement of a landlord-tenant action brought by a private tenant
against the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture and a private landlord operating
federally-subsidized housing. The court held that the parties' settlement mooted the ac-
tion. Id. at 1224. Despite the settlement, plaintiff insisted that the issue was "capable of
repetition, yet evading review," thereby permitting exception to the mootness doctrine.
Id. at 1222; see also Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911) (excep-
tion to mootness doctrine). The court disagreed, finding that it was not "reasonably
likely" that the issue would arise again and even if it did, "it will not be one that evades
review." Kennedy, 784 F.2d at 1224. Because the issue failed to satisfy the requirements
for the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" standard, the court refused to allow an
exception to the mootness doctrine and vacated pursuant to Munsingwear. See id. at
1225.
37. See Memorial Hosp., 862 F.2d at 1303 ("Judges must have at heart the interests of
other litigants in future cases, and hold them equal in weight with the interests of today's
[litigants]."); Nestle, 756 F.2d at 282 ("Our inquiry, therefore, is limited to whether the
district court abused its discretion in subordinating the parties' interests to what it con-
sidered to be the public interest in the finality of judgments." (citation omitted)); see also
Note, Avoiding Issue Preclusion by Settlement Conditioned upon the Vacatur of Entered
Judgments, 96 Yale L.J. 860, 866 (1987) ("[S]ettlement conditioned on vacatur... draws
private and public goals into confrontation.").
Characterizing vacatur as a contest between public and private interests has the effect
of discouraging public-minded judges from granting vacatur. See Memorial Hosp., 862
F.2d at 1302. See generally G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d
[Vol. 58
1989] VA CA TUR
when parties seek vacatur, however, depends on how such goals, particu-
larly public goals, are defined.38
Courts favoring vacatur emphasize the parties' private interests in end-
ing the dispute39 and the public interest in judicial resources conserved
by an early end to litigation.' If the public interest is defined as conser-
vation of judicial resources, vacatur should be allowed because it stimu-
lates settlements that conserve judicial resources.41
Courts opposed to vacatur hold that the public interests in precedent 42
and collateral estoppel4 3 outweigh the parties' private interest in ending
the litigation.44
The public interest reflects both sets of values.45 Because the decision
to grant or to deny vacatur requires a balancing of interests, one must
analyze the relative values of the interests involved. The private parties'
interests in support of vacatur are substantial and immediate-terminat-
ing a dispute, saving legal expenses and resuming more productive activ-
ity.46 In most cases, the public interests militating against vacatur, such
648, 664 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (judges must adhere to "generally
applicable norms," such as protecting public interests); NLRB v. Brooke Industries, 867
F.2d 434, 436 (7th Cir. 1989) (citing Memorial Hosp., 862 F.2d at 1302) (emphasizing
judicial duty to consider public interests).
38. Compare Nestle Co. v. Chester's Mkt., 756 F.2d 280, 282 (2d Cir. 1985) (defining
public interest as early termination of litigation) with In re Memorial Hosp., 862 F.2d
1299, 1302 (7th Cir. 1988) (defining public interest as value of precedent).
39. See Federal Data Corp. v. SMS Data Prods. Group, 819 F.2d 277, 279 (Fed. Cir.
1987) ("[A]II of the parties to the [litigation] have agreed to settle their differences ....
Like the court in Nestle, we see no reason to force the parties here to continue the litiga-
tion."); Nestle, 756 F.2d at 284 (parties "wish only to settle the present litigation").
40. See Federal Data Corp., 819 F.2d at 280 ("[T]o require the parties who. have set-
tled their differences to continue to litigate ... is unjust not only to the parties, but is
wasteful of the resources of the judiciary.").
41. See infra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
42. See In re Memorial Hosp., 862 F.2d 1299, 1302 (7th Cir. 1988) ("[T]he judicial
system ought not allow the social value of th[e] precedent.., to be a bargaining chip in
the process of settlement.").
43. See id. at 1303; Ringsby Truck Lines v. Western Conf. of Teamsters, 686 F.2d
720, 721 (9th Cir. 1982) ("[Vacatur] would undermine the risks inherent in taking any
controversy to trial and, in cases such as this one, provide the dissatisfied party with an
opportunity to relitigate the same issues.").
44. In Memorial Hospital, the court acknowledged the difficulty of balancing the
interests.
The recipient of the settlement offer will see nothing but injustice if the court
invokes some abstruse systemic interest as justification for balking. "Why am I
to be held hostage to some interest that is no concern of mine?", the party is
entitled to ask. Perhaps the judicial system has no answer that will satisfy such
a party .... [However,] []udges must have at heart the interests of other liti-
gants in future cases, and hold them equal in weight with the interests of today's
[litigants].
862 F.2d at 1303.
45. See id. at 1302 (settlement benefits litigants requiring judicial attention and prece-
dent benefits litigants trying similar issues).
46. See In re Memorial Hosp., 862 F.2d 1299, 1302 (7th Cir. 1988); Nestle Co. v.
Chester's Market, 756 F.2d 280, 284 (2d Cir. 1985).
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as precedent and collateral estoppel-both representing future preserva-
tion of judicial resources-are remote and speculative. 7 Substantial, im-
mediate and actual interests should be given more weight than remote
and speculative ones.48
D. Balancing Interests in Review of the Motion to Vacate
As an element of the settlement agreement, parties often request vaca-
tur in their motion to dismiss the action. Parties seeking vacatur are
effectively seeking relief from the judgment of the lower court.49 The
parties may move to dismiss and vacate before the district court that
issued the judgment,50 pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
60(b). 1 Alternatively, they may move before the circuit court where the
appeal is pending pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure
42(b)12 to dismiss the case and vacate the lower court ruling.5 3
47. See Nestle, 756 F.2d at 284.
48. See id.; see also Greenbaum, supra note 32, at 38:
[T]hese concerns may be outweighed by the desire to facilitate settlement of the
ongoing litigation. Encouraging settlement may go farther in reducing the bur-
den on the court system, a principal concern of the preclusion doctrines, than
would preserving a judgment's preclusive effects for use in future cases which
may never arise.
Id.
49. See Nestle Co. v. Chester's Mkt., 596 F. Supp. 1445, 1449 (D. Conn. 1984), rev'd
756 F.2d 280 (2d Cir. 1985).
50. See Nestle, 596 F. Supp. at 1447. In Nestle, the parties made the motion to vacate
before the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. See Nestle Co. v. Chester's Mkt., 756
F.2d 280, 281 (2d Cir. 1985). Judge Newman remanded, holding that the district court
should consider vacatur first, because the parties had the right of appeal. See id.
51. Rule 60(b) provides in pertinent part, "[o]n motion and upon such terms as are
just, the court may relieve a party or a party's legal representative from a final judgment,
order, or proceeding for the following reasons:
i6)'any... reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." Fed. R. Civ.
P. 60(b).
Because no Federal Rule specifically mentions vacatur, courts have treated motions to
vacate under a variety of rules. At least one court has treated the motion to vacate as a
motion pursuant to Rule 59(e). See Kennedy v. Block, 784 F.2d 1220, 1222 (4th Cir.
1986). Because Rule 59(e) provides for a motion to "alter or amend" a judgment, not to
expunge it, it does not have an effect on the issue of vacatur. See In re Memorial Hosp.,
862 F.2d 1299, 1300 (7th Cir. 1988) (vacatur "expunge[s]" judgment).
52. Rule 42(b) provides in pertinent part that "[i]f the parties to an appeal or other
proceeding shall sign and file with the clerk of the court of appeals an agreement that the
proceeding be dismissed ... the clerk shall enter the case dismissed, but no mandate or
other process shall issue without an order of the court." Fed. R. App. P. 42(b).
A Rule 42(a) motion, made before the appellate court but providing for dismissal of the
appeal in the district court, provides that "[i]f an appeal has not been docketed, the ap-
peal may be dismissed by the district court upon the filing in that court of a stipulation
for dismissal signed by all the parties, or upon motion and notice by the appellant." Fed.
R. App. P. 42(a).
53. Because motions to vacate are made under federal rules governing dismissal,
which are discretionary, both district courts and appellate courts hold that the decision to
grant or to deny vacatur is a matter of judicial discretion. See In re Memorial Hosp., 862
F.2d 1299, 1302 (7th Cir. 1988) ("[T]he judge.., must ensure that the agreement is an
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Although motions to vacate are made pursuant to discretionary fed-
eral rules,54 the circuits have not treated vacatur as a matter of discre-
tion. 5 Many courts either grant or deny vacatur as a matter of law,
leading to contradictory results.5 6 To ensure consistency in resolving
motions to vacate, to avoid conflicting results and to encourage settle-
ment, there should be a presumption in favor of allowing these mo-
tions. 7 A presumption, rather than a mandatory rule, gives the court
the prerogative to deny the motion to vacate. Thus, the value of the
lower court's judgment would be preserved when the facts and circum-
stances of the case warrant,58 for example, in cases of first impression. In
such cases, litigants would be prevented from having important judg-
appropriate commitment of judicial time and complies with legal norms."); Nestle Co. v.
Chester's Mkt., 756 F.2d 280, 282 (2d Cir. 1985) ("Our inquiry... is limited to whether
the district court abused its discretion.... ."); Nestle Co. v. Chester's Mkt., 596 F. Supp.
1445, 1450 (D. Conn. 1984) ("It is apparent.., that the court has substantial discretion
in this matter.... ."), revd, 756 F.2d 280 (2d Cir. 1985). As a result, a circuit court may
reverse a district court's decision to grant or deny vacatur only if the decision constitutes
an abuse of discretion. Generally, the standard of review for abuse of discretion requires
a finding by the appellate court that the district court made a serious error in judgment.
See LeSportsac v. K-Mart, 754 F.2d 71, 74-75 (2d Cir. 1985). In some cases, courts have
held that the abuse of discretion standard requires circumstances akin to the "trial court
[taking] leave of its senses... ." Id. (quoting Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31
Emory L.J. 747, 763 (1982)). It is difficult to imagine a situation that would require
reversal of a district judge's vacatur decision, however, if the district court considers the
public and private interests involved. See Memorial Hosp., 862 F.2d at 1303 (public and
private interests must be held "equal in weight"). A careful balancing of these interests
should always satisfy an appellate court that the district court did not abuse its discretion.
See Nestle, 596 F. Supp. at 1450-55. But see Nestle, 756 F.2d at 284 (reversing district
court's discretionary judgment).
54. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
55. The Second Circuit has implicitly held that vacatur is available to parties as a
matter of right. See Nestle, 756 F.2d at 283. Denial of this right is an abuse of discretion.
See id. at 284. Paradoxically, vacatur is based on discretionary federal rules, yet it is
granted as a matter of law. In Nestle, the paradox is illustrated by the appellate court's
conclusory holding that the district court abused its discretion by refusing to grant vaca-
tur, with no explanation of how this abuse occurred. See id.; see also Note, supra note 37,
at 865 & n.34 (arguing Second Circuit rule is "absolute").
The Seventh Circuit has also implicitly held the question of whether to grant vacatur to
be one of law. See, e.g., Memorial Hosp., 862 F.2d at 1300; Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz,
807 F.2d 520, 585 (7th Cir. 1986).
56. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
57. See Federal Data Corp. v. SMS Data Prods. Group, 819 F.2d 277, 280 (Fed. Cir.
1987) ("When the parties have settled their differences, then the appropriate course of
action is for the appellate court to dismiss the action and to vacate the judgment be-
low."). Parties should not be forced to continue to litigate against their will. See id. at
279; Nestle, 756 F.2d at 284.
58. A presumption would allow courts to account for circumstances where the public
interests in a given case outweigh the private interests, see supra notes 37-45 and accom-
panying text, and require denial of vacatur, despite the presumption. See generally
NLRB v. Brooke Industries, 867 F.2d 434, 436 (7th Cir. 1989) (judges need not "rubber
stamp" parties' settlement proposals) (citing In re Memorial Hosp., 862 F.2d 1299, 1302
(7th Cir. 1988)).
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ments capriciously "wiped from the books." 9
II. VACATUR'S EFFECT ON SETTLEMENT AND JUDGMENT
Vacatur helps to achieve the goal of settlement at a minimum cost with
respect to the conflicting public and private interests in the contexts of
vacatur's effect on settlement, precedent and issue preclusion. Concerns
that the value of important judgments will be lost can be addressed by
treating motions to vacate with a presumption that favors them but that
allows courts to consider extraordinary circumstances when necessary.
A. Encouraging Settlement
There is overwhelming authority in favor of settlement.' It eases
docket congestion and reflects a voluntary resolution of the dispute,
rather than a coercive solution imposed by judgment. Encouraging set-
tlement is a primary consideration for courts granting vacatur,61 because
common sense suggests that settlement is more likely to occur when
there are more negotiating options open to parties.62
59. Ringsby Truck Lines v. Western Conf. of Teamsters, 686 F.2d 720, 721 (9th Cir.
1982).
60. See supra note 18.
It has been argued that resolving disputes by settlement rather than judicial
decision provides additional benefits beyond the saving of judicial resources and
those of the parties, including: (1) providing a higher quality of justice; (2) pro-
moting the litigants' interests in autonomy; and (3) facilitating the restoration of
working relationships among the parties.
Greenbaum, supra note 32, at 38 n.140 (citing Chemetron Corp. v. Business Funds, Inc.,
682 F.2d 1149, 1202 n.5 (5th Cir. 1982) (Reavley, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 460 U.S.
1013 (1983)).
For different arguments which oppose a vigorous policy favoring settlement, see Pos-
ner, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods ofAlternative Dispute Resolution: Some
Cautionary Observations, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 366, 388 (1986) (increasing amount of settle-
ment may result in short-term cost reduction, but "in the long run the litigation rate may
rise") and Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 Yale L.J. 1073, 1085 (1984) (settlement merely
produces "peace," not "justice").
61. See Nestle Co. v. Chester's Mkt., 756 F.2d 280, 282 (2d Cir. 1985):
For the same reasons that the case is not moot, the judgment here is subject to
reversal on appeal. We are thus not faced with new litigation which seeks to
avoid directly or indirectly an otherwise final judgment, such as a collateral
attack or a claim that a judgment previously entered in litigation between the
parties over the same subject matter is not preclusive. To the contrary, here we
are faced with a settlement that will bring pending litigation to an end.
Id. at 282; see also Federal Data Corp. v. SMS Data Prods. Group, 819 F.2d 277, 279
(Fed. Cir. 1987) (granting vacatur because "[i]t is long established that courts favor dis-
pute resolution through voluntary settlements") (citing Williams v. First Nat'l Bank, 216
U.S. 582, 595 (1910)).
62. "[S]ettlement connotes a bargained agreement to end the litigation .... In this
situation, perhaps the parties should be allowed to treat the continued viability of the
judgment as a negotiable issue. Such an approach [favoring vacatur] would encourage
settlement . . . ." Greenbaum, supra note 32, at 36-37 (citing lB J. Moore, Moore's
Federal Practice 1 0.444[1] (2d ed. 1983); 18 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal
Practice & Procedure § 4433 (1975 & Cum. Supp. 1980)).
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Of course, the likelihood of settlement conditioned on vacatur depends
on the attractiveness of vacatur to the parties. Vacatur is an especially
attractive term of settlement, because it may help a party to reach a
number of its more general goals in settling its case.63 Aside from depriv-
ing a judgment of preclusive effect, vacatur would "cloudf- and dimin-
ishli the significance of the [judgment]" inside and outside of the
litigation context, allowing a party to protect himself from the impact of
an adverse judgment.
In the litigation context, a party might wish to vacate a judgment even
when it would not be preclusive in the future. For example, the parties in
In re Memorial Hospital65 who were denied vacatur were not motivated
by issue preclusion.66 The United States, the losing party at the trial
court level, is not subject to offensive nonmutual issue preclusion as a
matter of law.67 It had been held in contempt by a federal bankruptcy
court.6" When the parties reached a settlement pending appeal and
sought vacatur, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit speculated
that the defendant was seeking to "escape notice" of the contempt judg-
ment against it through vacatur.69
Outside a litigation, vacatur could be a useful public relations tool, a
factor of growing importance in the law.7" Assume that P, a local resi-
dent, brings a tort action in nuisance against D, an out-of-state company
that has allegedly dumped toxic waste on P's property. D loses the judg-
ment and the judge issues a scathing recitation of the company's toxic
dumping activity. As anxious as D is to reduce its legal bills and the
judgment it owes P, D is also concerned about its relationship with the
local community. As part of a generous settlement agreement, P agrees
to vacatur. Subsequently, with the help of a public relations firm, D is
able to characterize the vacated judgment as worthless. To a non-lawyer,
vacatur might imply that the judgment itself was "wrong," due to judi-
cial error or the emergence of some evidence supporting the loser. In the
public's eyes, a vacated judgment may be a discredited judgment, thereby
63. "Compelling and reasonable circumstances may influence the defendant to enter
into a settlement even though he still denies liability to the plaintiff." Note, The Impact
of Collateral Estoppel on Postjudgment Settlements, 15 Sw. U.L. Rev. 343, 352 (1985)
(citing Berner v. British Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, Ltd., 346 F.2d 532 (2d Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 983 (1966)).
Avoiding issue preclusion is not the only reason to seek vacatur. See In re Memorial
Hosp., 862 F.2d 1299, 1302-03 (7th Cir. 1988) (suggesting alternative reasons for seeking
vacatur). But see Note, supra note 37, at 860 ("Indeed, the very purpose of settlement
conditioned on vacatur is to avoid future issue preclusion.").
64. Memorial Hosp., 862 F.2d at 1302.
65. 862 F.2d 1299 (7th Cir. 1988).
66. See id. at 1303.
67. See id. (citing United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 162 (1984)).
68. See In re Memorial Hosp., 82 B.R. 478 (W.D. Wis.), appeal dismissed, 862 F.2d
1299 (7th Cir. 1988).
69. See In re Memorial Hosp., 862 F.2d 1299, 1302 (7th Cir. 1988).
70. See generally N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 1989, § 6, part 2 (Business World Magazine),
at 27 (attorneys conducting leveraged buyouts employ public relations tactics).
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vindicating the claim of the losing party.7
While parties often find vacatur useful, it may not encourage settle-
ment at every point in a litigation. Vacatur may discourage early settle-
ment72 because a party could seek an initial judgment with the
knowledge that should it lose, it could settle and vacate, preserving its
right to relitigate.73 The danger of relitigation, however, which has not
been realized in the past,74 may be prevented by judicial sanction."
Cases and commentators expressing concern about parties shopping
for acceptable judgments by vacating unacceptable ones76 ignore two
71. See generally Memorial Hosp., 862 F.2dpassim. The court in Memorial Hospital
expressed concern that the defendant might "escape notice" of a contempt judgment en-
tered against it. Id. at 1302. While the court is apparently referring to judicial notice, its
analysis applies equally well to public notice.
An observer concerned about the political or social policy implications of this hypo-
thetical would be wary of vacatur. See Fiss, supra note 60, at 1078 ("The chief executive
officer of a corporation may settle a suit to prevent embarrassing disclosures about his
managerial policies, but such disclosures might well be in the interest of the sharehold-
ers," or the public.) (citing Wolf v. Barkes, 348 F.2d 994 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
941 (1965)).
72. The Seventh Circuit, denying vacatur because of its effect on issue preclusion and
precedent, briefly noted that its approach encourages settlement before a district court
judgment is rendered. See Memorial Hosp., 862 F.2d at 1302 ("If parties want to avoid
stare decisis and preclusive effects, they need only settle before the district court renders a
decision, an outcome our approach encourages."). But see Federal Data Corp. v. SMS
Data Prods. Group, 819 F.2d 277, 279 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (denying vacatur forces contin-
ued litigation by discouraging settlement once the district court judgment has been en-
tered); Nestle Co. v. Chester's Mkt., 756 F.2d 280, 282 (2d Cir. 1985) (same).
Underlying the court's argument is a fear of relitigation. See Memorial Hosp., 862 F.2d
at 1302. As discussed below, vacatur does not necessarily abrogate preclusion and vaca-
tur in past cases has not led to relitigation. See infra notes 93-111 and accompanying
text.
73. See Ringsby Truck Lines v. Western Conf. of Teamsters, 686 F.2d 720, 721 (9th
Cir. 1982) (vacatur "provide[s] the dissatisfied party with an opportunity to relitigate the
same issues") (footnote omitted); see also Note, supra note 37, at 868 (wealthy party may
forego settlement for trial, knowing it can press for vacatur as term of subsequent
settlement).
74. See infra notes 110-111 and accompanying text.
75. See Nestle Co. v. Chester's Mkt., 756 F.2d 280, 284 (2d Cir. 1985) (describing
penalties for "repetitive" antitrust litigation). The Nestle court wrote that sanctions
would mitigate the issue preclusion problem of vacatur, see infra notes 93-Ill, at least in
antitrust and trademark cases.
[T]he threat of baseless and oppressive litigation by trademark holders was con-
siderably overstated by the district court in light of remedies provided by the
antitrust laws against those who resort to baseless or repetitive legal proceed-
ings for the purpose of restraining competition.
Nestle, 756 F.2d. at 284 (citing California Motor Transport v. Trucking Unlimited, 404
U.S. 508 (1972); Walker Process Equip. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172
(1965); Litton Sys. v. AT&T, 700 F.2d 785 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1073
(1984); Landmarks Holding Corp. v. Bermant, 664 F.2d 891 (2d Cir. 1981)).
76. See In re Memorial Hosp., 862 F.2d 1299, 1302 (7th Cir. 1988); Ringsby, 686 F.2d
at 721; see also Note, supra note 37, at 868 ("Settlement conditioned on vacatur ...
encourag[es] wealthy litigants to sue until reaching favorable outcomes ... ."); Comment,
Letting The Chips Fall: The Second Circuit's Decision on Toll House, 52 Brooklyn L.
Rev. 1029, 1032 (1986) ("[I]t is not clear that the parties should always be allowed to
negotiate away the collateral estoppel claims of others.").
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facts. First, even a vacated judgment has some persuasive authority,
both as precedent 77 and for issue preclusion purposes.78 Second, the sub-
sequent history of vacated judgments suggests that relitigation is not a
valid concern.79
B. Precedent
The value that one places on precedent8 ° in part depends on the view
that one takes of the judicial process. There are many schools of
thought, characterized perhaps at their extremes as the older private liti-
gation model and the newer public litigation model.81
Courts adhering to the private litigation model favor settlement and
reject the idea of forcing parties to be "private attorneys general."82
Under this view, litigation is primarily a method available to private par-
ties to resolve their disputes. As such, it should remain as free as possible
77. See infra note 90 and accompanying text.
78. See infra notes 101-103 and accompanying text.
79. See infra notes 110-111 and accompanying text.
80. Precedent is defined as "[a]n adjudged case or decision of a court, considered as
furnishing an example or authority for an identical or similar case afterwards arising or a
similar question of law." Black's Law Dictionary 1059 (5th ed. 1979).
81. See Chayes, Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 Harv. L.
Rev. 4 (1982). "In the classical model, litigation is viewed as a mode of dispute settle-
ment.... In the contemporary model, the subject matter of the litigation is not a dispute
between private parties, but [reflects] a grievance about the content or conduct of policy
.... " Id. at 4-5.
At least one Supreme Court justice has expressed his preference for the classical model.
See Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 761 (1987) (Scalia, J.) (dictum) ("In all civil litiga-
tion, the judicial decree is not the end but the means.").
The private litigation model is reflected in the ADR movement, which emphasizes
dispute resolution. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. The public litigation
model is reflected by the work of Professor Fiss, who emphasizes the importance of final
judgment. See Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 29 (1979)
("[C]ourts exist to give meaning to our public values, not to resolve disputes."). Courts
tend to implicitly assume an ADR position or a Fiss position when considering vacatur.
For an explanation of the arguments in support of both models, compare Fiss, supra
note 60, at 1089 ("Civil litigation is an institutional arrangement for using state power to
bring a recalcitrant reality closer to our chosen ideals."), with McThenia & Shaffer, supra
note 21, at 1664 ("Settlement is a process of reconciliation .... ).
The debate over the purpose of litigation is beyond the scope of this Note. However,
express adherents to the Fiss position would conceivably oppose vacatur for the same
reason that they oppose settlement, because it deprives society of the benefit of judgment.
See generally Fiss, supra note 60, at 1085.
82. See Federal Data Corp. v. SMS Data Prods. Group, 819 F.2d 277, 279 (Fed. Cir.
1987) ("[W]e see no reason to force the parties here to continue the litigation."); Nestle
Co. v. Chester's Mkt., 756 F.2d 280, 284 (2d Cir. 1985) ("[T]he district court imposed the
heavy burden on trademark defendants of having to continue to litigate when they would
prefer to settle, a ruling without precedent."); Nestle Co. v. Chester's Mkt., 596 F. Supp.
1445, 1451 (D. Conn. 1984) ("There can be no doubt that to deny the motion would work
some hardship on the parties.... Thus the parties will face continued litigation despite
their expressed preference for settlement."), rev'd 756 F.2d 280 (2d Cir. 1985). See gener-
ally Van Bronkhorst v. Safeco Corp., 529 F.2d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 1976) (policy favors
compromise and settlement of doubtful rights and controversies rather than litigation of
issues).
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from public concerns, focusing instead on the parties' assessment of their
best interests. This view accords with the policies of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, both of
which encourage settlement."3
Courts rejecting vacatur take a contrary view, using the precedential
value of the district court judgment as a basis for their refusal to grant
vacatur s4 While initiation of the litigation is exclusively the parties'
business, once the legal process has been engaged and the resources of the
judiciary have been invoked, the judgment of the court becomes public
property with precedential value."5 Although the result is public prop-
erty, the process itself is not. If it were, courts that reject vacatur because
judgments are public property would be obligated to reject for the same
reason settlement before a lower court judgment was rendered. 6
Thus, the conflict between the value of precedent and the value of set-
tlement, which implicates the value of vacatur, is evident when a pre-
mium is placed on creating precedent. Settlement precludes the existence
of the precedent embodied in a final appellate judgment.8 7 The vacated
lower court judgment itself has no formal precedential value.88 Both of
these effects rob the dispute of the social value inherent in precedent.8 9
Vacatur, however, is not the same as a reversal or an overruling. 90 A
well-reasoned, albeit vacated, district court decision that remains in the
reporters will influence future judges and litigants, who may look to it
when faced with similar facts and issues." Therefore, vacatur does not,
83. See supra note I and accompanying text.
84. See In re Memorial Hosp., 862 F.2d 1299, 1302 (7th Cir. 1988); Ringsby Truck
Lines v. Western Conf. of Teamsters, 686 F.2d 720, 721 (9th Cir. 1982). But see Memo-
rial Hosp., 862 F.2d at 1302 (rejecting vacatur, but acknowledging that "litigation is con-
ducted to resolve the parties' controversies; precedent is a byproduct of resolving disputes
rather than the raison d'etre of the judicial system.") (citing Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S.
755, 761 (1987)).
85. See Memorial Hosp., 862 F.2d at 1302-03 (precedent has "social value"; vacatur
"squanders judicial time that has already been invested"; court "retains an interest in the
orderliness of its own processes"); Ringsby, 686 F.2d at 721 (parties dissatisfied with trial
court's findings should not be permitted to have decision "wiped from the books").
86. See generally Memorial Hosp., 862 F.2d at 1302. The Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals considers a judgment to be a "public act of a public official," which may not be
used as a "bargaining chip." Id. This reasoning would apply to the legal process, if it
were also considered to be a public activity.
87. See Nestle Co. v. Chester's Mkt., 756 F.2d 280, 284 (2d Cir. 1985).
88. See County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 634 n.6 (1979) (holding that
judgment vacated due to moot appeal has no precedential effect). But see id. at 646 n. 10
(Powell, J., dissenting) ("expressions of the court below on the merits, if not reversed, will
continue to have precedential weight").
89. See In re Memorial Hosp., 862 F.2d 1299, 1302 (7th Cir. 1988); see also Fiss,
supra note 60, at 1085.
90. Despite its belief that the value of precedent should be given substantial weight in
balancing the costs of vacatur, the Seventh Circuit has acknowledged that the analysis in
a vacated judgment will continue to be available for future courts and litigants, see Me-
morial Hosp., 862 F.2d at 1302, even if its actual legal authority is doubtful. See supra
note 88 and accompanying text.
91. See Memorial Hosp., 862 F.2d at 1302. -"[Lower court] decisions have persuasive
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as its critics contend, wholly deprive the dispute of precedential value.
Furthermore, a presumption in favor of vacatur would still allow an ap-
pellate court to consider a narrow range of special circumstances. For
example, in cases of first impression, courts and litigants need guidance.
In these situations, precedent might have unusual importance that would
outweigh private interests in ending the dispute and public interest in
clearing the docket. 92
C. Issue Preclusion
Motions to vacate are often motivated by a desire to avoid the preclu-
sive effects of the lower court judgment.93 Issue preclusion bars a party
from relitigating an issue that they have had an opportunity to litigate
fully in a previous case.94 Most cases, on both sides of the vacatur issue,
doubt the issue preclusive effect of judgments vacated pursuant to settle-
ment.95 Indeed, vacated judgments are generally not given preclusive ef-
fect.9 6  Cases and commentators opposed to vacatur uniformly cite
vacatur's effect on issue preclusion as a primary reason for refusal to
force as precedent that may save other judges and litigants time in future cases. Some of
this force would remain as long as the court's opinion were available to read; it does not
vanish on vacatur." Id.; see also 13A C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice
and Procedure § 3533.10, at 443 (2d ed. 1984) (even vacated opinions have been "tested
in the same crucible as all opinions" and are therefore no less persuasive).
92. Fiss argues that judges are bound to "explicate and give force to the values em-
bodied in authoritative texts such as the Constitution and statutes [by creating prece-
dents]: to interpret those values and to bring reality into accord with them. This duty is
not discharged when the parties settle." See Fiss, supra note 60, at 1085. Although set-
tlement and ADR appear to contradict this goal, they are designed to make the legal
process more efficient and an efficient system is predicate to the ability ofjudges to "expli-
cate" and "give force" to important values. Many commentators do not believe the pres-
ent system is efficient. See, e.g., supra note 11 and accompanying text. An inefficient
system is less likely to produce a just result. Such a system may deny individuals justice
in cases in which resolution of disputes is delayed for months or years. Furthermore,
inefficiency may deny judges the time necessary to render thoughtful decisions on issues
of first impression or on issues having substantial social impact. See Miller, supra note
11, at 1 ("It is axiomatic that justice delayed is justice denied."). Justice is Fiss's ultimate
goal. See Fiss, supra note 60, at 1085. Both precedent and efficiency serve the same end,
justice, albeit in different ways.
93. See Nestle Co. v. Chester's Mkt., 756 F.2d 280, 281 (2d Cir. 1985); Ringsby
Truck Lines v. Western Conf. of Teamsters, 686 F.2d 720, 721 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1982).
94. See F. James & G. Hazard, supra note 4, § 11.3, at 590-91.
95. See In re Memorial Hosp., 862 F.2d 1299, 1303 (7th Cir. 1988) ("The parties may
be free to contract about the preclusive effects of these decisions inter se ... [T]hey are
not free to contract about the existence of these decisions.") (emphasis original); Kennedy
v. Block, 784 F.2d 1220, 1225 (4th Cir. 1986) ("Dismissal [under Munsingwear] will of
course leave open and unresolved the question addressed by the district court in its earlier
published opinion.") (citing United States v. Munsingwear, 340 U.S. 36, 40-41 (1950)).
96. See No East-West Highway Comm. v. Chandler, 767 F.2d 21, 24 (1st Cir. 1985)(vacated judgment has no preclusive effect); Dodrill v. Ludt, 764 F.2d 442, 444 (6th Cir.
1985) ("[T]he general rule is that a judgment which is vacated, for whatever reason, is
deprived of its conclusive effect as collateral estoppel."); De Nafo v. Finch, 436 F.2d 737,
740 (3d Cir. 1971) (same).
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grant vacatur 97 vacatur's critics do not want to afford litigants an oppor-
tunity to relitigate.98
Vacated judgments are not considered issue preclusive because these
judgments are not "final" for preclusive purposes. 99 Finality may be evi-
denced by appellate review, which is absent when the action is mooted
pending appeal." ° The absence of appellate review in a vacated case,
however, does not necessarily mean that there is insufficient finality to
bar issue preclusion in future cases. 10' When the parties voluntarily end
their litigation through settlement and vacatur, a future court may apply
issue preclusion, given that the parties had an opportunity to litigate fully
and fairly their dispute.102 If the parties were fully heard, if the court's
opinion were reasoned and if the decision were appealable, then the deci-
sion could be considered final for the purpose of preclusion."13
Of course, widespread use of issue preclusion in cases when the prior
judgment has been vacated might discourage settlement. It would make
vacatur less attractive to parties considering settlement, because avoiding
a judgment's preclusive effects is a primary reason for vacatur. 'I
97. See, e.g., In re Memorial Hosp., 862 F.2d 1299, 1302 (7th Cir. 1988); Ringsby
Truck Lines v. Western Conf. of Teamsters, 686 F.2d 720, 721 (9th Cir. 1982); see also
Note, supra note 37, at 862 (arguing importance of preclusive effects).
98. See Memorial Hosp., 862 F.2d at 1302; Ringsby, 686 F.2d at 721.
99. See Chemetron Corp. v. Business Funds, 682 F.2d 1149, 1190 (5th Cir. 1982)
("[T]here must be 'judicial finality' before collateral estoppel can be invoked."), cert. de-
nied, 460 U.S. 1013 (1983).
100. See United States v. Munsingwear, 340 U.S. 36, 39-40 (1950).
101. Id. at 38-39.
102. See Chemetron, 682 F.2d at 1190-91. In Chemetron, there was no final judgment
entered. See id. at 1192. However, the trial court made findings of fact and conclusions
of law which had been set aside as part of the settlement agreement. The Chemetron
court applied issue preclusion despite the set-aside and absence of final judgment, re-
marking that defendant "cannot have it both ways," by avoiding the adverse judgment
and its preclusive effects. Id.; see also Pontarelli Limousine v. City of Chicago, 704 F.
Supp. 1503, 1514 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (dictum) ("[W]ere this court applying federal law...
[the vacated judgment in question] should be given preclusive effect.") (citing Chemetron,
682 F.2d 1149).
For examples of application of collateral estoppel in other cases where a party declined
appellate review, see Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co., 297 F.2d 80, 89 (2d
Cir. 1961) ("'Finality' in the context here relevant may mean little more than that the
litigation of a particular issue has reached such a stage that a court sees no really good
reason for permitting it to be litigated again."), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 986 (1962).
It is possible that a federal circuit court routinely rejecting vacatur to preserve issue
preclusion would treat a vacated judgment from another circuit as issue preclusive in a
new action in its circuit by citing Alexander v. Chicago Park Dist., 773 F.2d 850, 855
(7th Cir. 1985) (applying issue preclusion based on adequacy of prior hearing), cert. de-
nied, 475 U.S. 1095 (1986); Chemetron, 682 F.2d at 1190-92 (same); Lummus, 297 F.2d
at 89 (same); Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 13, comment g, at 136 (1982) (same).
One commentator has noted the widespread use of collateral estoppel and urges that it
should be "reluctantly and cautiously" applied to postjudgment settlements, citing a vari-
ety of factors generally applicable to cases where only one judgment has been rendered.
See Note, supra note 63, at 353-54.
103. Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 13, comment g, at 136 (1982).
104. See supra note 93 and accompanying text. Naturally, parties seeking vacatur for
other reasons, see supra notes 63-71 and accompanying text, would not be deterred.
19891 VA CA TUR
In the future, circuits seeking to foster settlement through vacatur
should resist the temptation to apply issue preclusion to prior judgments
vacated as a condition of settlement. At the risk of encouraging relitiga-
tion,10 5 these courts should note that issue preclusion and vacatur serve
the same purpose---conservation of judicial resources.106 "Because the
policies favoring finality of judgments are intended to conserve judicial
and private resources, the denial of a motion for vacatur is counter-
productive because it will lead to more rather than less litigation." 107
It is unclear whether vacatur or issue preclusion contributes more to
judicial economy. Although issue preclusion prevents relitigation,108 it is
impossible empirically to measure its effects because one cannot deter-
mine how many parties are discouraged from coming to court for a sec-
ond try, knowing that they are likely to lose as soon as the other party
makes a summary judgment motion.109 It is possible to test the effect of
vacatur, however. Among 10 judgments reported to have been vacated
in 7 circuits between 1968 and 1987,110 none has been reported as having
been relitigated.111 This indicates that relitigation has not been en-
105. See Nestle Co. v. Chester's Mkt., 756 F.2d 280, 284 (2d Cir. 1985) (danger of
relitigation may be overstated as matter of law); see also infra notes 110-111 and accom-
panying text.
106. Denying vacatur defeats the goals of issue preclusion. See Nestle, 756 F.2d at 282;
see also Nestle Co. v. Chester's Market, 596 F. Supp. 1445, 1451-53 (D. Conn. 1984)
(comparing goals of issue preclusion with consequences of vacatur), rev'd, 756 F.2d 280
(2d Cir. 1985).
107. Nestle, 756 F.2d at 282; see also 13A C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, supra
note 91, § 3533.10, at 432.
All of the policies that make voluntary settlement so important a means of con-
cluding litigation apply. The appellee as well as the appellant may prefer settle-
ment, and can bargain for whatever future protection it needs. It cannot be
argued that the possible nonmutual preclusion interests of nonparties justify
either appellate decision against the wishes of the parties, or an insistence that
as a price of settlement the appellant must permit the district court judgment to
support nonmutual preclusion. The parties should remain free to settle on
terms that require vacation of the judgment, entry of a new consent judgment,
or such other action as fits their needs.
Id.; In re Memorial Hosp., 862 F.2d 1299, 1303 (7th Cir. 1988) (suggesting parties can
agree privately on preclusive effects of vacated judgment).
108. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
109. Pursuant to Rule 56, either plaintiff or defendant may move for summary judg-
ment based on affidavits arguing the preclusive effect of a past judgment on the case in
question. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.
110. See First Nat'l Bank v. Don Adams Mining Co., 844 F.2d 1445 (10th Cir. 1988);
Federal Data Corp. v. SMS Data Prods. Group, 819 F.2d 277 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Kennedy
v. Block, 784 F.2d 1220 (4th Cir. 1986); Nestle Co. v. Chester's Mkt., 756 F.2d 280 (2d
Cir. 1985); Kinzenbaw v. Deere & Co., 741 F.2d 383 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470
U.S. 1004 (1985); Aviation Enters. v. Orr, 716 F.2d 1403 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Delta Air
Lines v. McCoy Restaurants, 708 F.2d 582 (11th Cir. 1983); Douglas v. Donovan, 704
F.2d 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union v. J.P.
Stevens & Co., 638 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1980); Swingline, Inc. v. I.B. Kleinert Rubber Co.,
399 F.2d 283 (C.C.P.A. 1968).
111. On October 21, 1989, the author of this Note conducted a search of the "Courts"
file in the "Genfed" library of LEXIS based on the case names and issues litigated. The
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couraged by vacatur; the fear of relitigation expressed by the opponents
of vacatur appears to be unfounded.
CONCLUSION
When parties settle pending appeal, their agreement often calls for va-
catur of the lower court judgment. The decision to vacate involves a
conflict between private interests favoring vacatur and public interests
opposing it. A careful analysis of the practical effects of vacatur suggests
that some public interests favor vacatur. Taken together with the parties'
private interest in ending their dispute, these interests outweigh the spec-
ulative fears about wasted judicial resources. Therefore, federal appellate
courts should employ a presumption that allows parties to include vaca-
tur as a condition of settlement to encourage the early termination of
litigation.
Henry E. Klingeman
search revealed that none of the issues has been the subject of a subsequent reported
decision.
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